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Postmodernists in the humanities and social sciences face three
principal problems. First, those among them who embrace the claim
that "physical 'reality,' no less than social 'reality,' is at bottom a social
and linguistic construct" 1 make the postmodernist enterprise appear
ridiculous to most of the non-academic world.2 Second, though postmodernists typically deny that they are moral relativists in the sense
that they hold no values, they rarely offer reasons for preferring the
values they hold-liberty, equality, and fraternity, say, rather than slav-
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1
The claim appears in a parody of postmodernism that was nonetheless published as a
genuine contribution by the editors of Social Text. See Alan D. Sokal, Transgressingthe Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity, 46/47 Social Text 217, 217
(Spring/Summer 1996). For Sokal's account of his hoax, see Alan D. Sokal, A Physicist Experiments with CulturalStudies, 6 Lingua Franca 62 (May/June 1996). For a list of papers responding
to Sokal's hoax, see his NYU faculty homepage, online at http://www.physics.nyu.edu/people/
sokal.alan.html (visited May 2,2004).
2
To be sure, many postmodernists purport to accept the reality of the external world. See,
for example, Richard Rorty, Does Academic Freedom Have PhilosophicalPresuppositions?,in
Louis Menand, ed, The Future of Academic Freedom 21, 30 (Chicago 1996) ("Given that it pays
to talk about mountains, as it certainly does, one of the obvious truths about mountains is that
they were here before we talked about them."). But to those untrained in philosophy, it is difficult to fathom exactly what that acceptance entails. See id (stating that "the utility of [the] language-games" in which postmodernists talk about mountains and other external objects "has
nothing to do with the question of whether Reality as It Is In Itself, apart from the way it is
handy for human beings to describe it, has mountains in it"). Well, alright, the point is difficult to
fathom even for many people who are trained in philosophy. See, for example, Ronald Dworkin,
Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25 Phil & Pub Aff 87, 95-96 (1996) (questioning
whether the statement that "mountains exist" and the statement that "mountains exist in Reality
as It Is In Itself" mean different things).

1245

1246

The University of Chicago Law Review

[71:1245

ery, caste, and alienation-other than that the former are, in fact, the
values they hold Third, although the anti-authoritarian impulses of
postmodernism tend to attract persons with left-of-center political
ideals and goals, as a consequence of the proximity of postmodernism
to moral relativism, postmodernists lack a normative vocabulary with
which to advance the values they hold.
The situation is somewhat more complex in the American legal
academy. As Mark Tushnet observes in the preface of The New Constitutional Order, criticism of objectivity and rationality by scholars
within the critical legal studies (CLS) movement is continuous with
4
parallel critiques by scholars in the humanities and social sciences.
Whatever its exact pedigree, and glossing over what are no doubt important distinctions to those within the relevant movements, CLS can
fairly be called a form of "applied postmodernism."' However, as I
shall explain momentarily, the assault on objectivity and rationality in
law has been part of mainstream legal thought for over a century, and
thus the crits are not nearly as vulnerable to appearing especially ridiculous or morally obtuse as are postmodernists in other disciplines.
But if the crits thus manage to dodge the first two problems I identified with other branches of postmodernism, they remain beset by the
third: their skepticism leaves them ill-equipped to argue for an affirmative project.
A very brief history of skepticism in American legal thought may
illuminate what, if anything, distinguishes CLS from mainstream legal
academic thought, and also why the former has reached an impasse.
To begin, as I have just noted, criticism of objectivity and rationality in
law has hardly been the exclusive province of left-wing radicals. For
example, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who led the first great attack on
legal formalism, was a social Darwinist in matters of politics' and occasionally law.' Holmes was nevertheless lionized by early twentiethcentury progressives because his skepticism led him to adopt a defer-

3
See, for example, Stanley Fish, Don't Blame Relativism, 12 Responsive Community 27,31
(Summer 2002) ("Our convictions are by definition preferred; that's what makes them our convictions, and relativizing them is neither an option nor a danger.").
4
"The critical legal studies approach" includes "a critique of certain claims about objectivity and rationality, particularly but not exclusively in law" (p ix).
5 In an important article on the CLS movement, Tushnet identified postmodemism as
only one strand of CLS. See Mark Tuishnet, CriticalLegal Studies:A PoliticalHistory, 100 Yale L
J 1515, 1518 (1991). In this Review, I use the term "postmodernism" somewhat more broadly to
encompass the various anti-foundationalist approaches that Tushnet distinguishes from postmodernism. See id at 1517-18 (distinguishing among "fem-crits," "critical race theorists," "postmodernists," "cultural radicals," and "political economists").
6
See Albert W. Alschuler, Law without Values: The Life, Work, and Legacy of Justice
Holmes 49 (Chicago 2000) ("A glorification of war, power, and struggle became the centerpiece
of Holmes's approach to just about everything.").
7
See Buck v Bell, 274 US 200,207 (1927) ("Three generations of imbeciles are enough.").
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ential posture toward the output of electorally accountable bodies,
and, as a Justice of the Supreme Court, to vote to uphold progressive
legislation Yet the association of skepticism with the political left
lasted only so long as courts were more conservative than legislatures.
When the Warren Court and its successors invoked abstract constitutional language in support of racial equality, the rights of criminal suspects, and sexual freedom, the left and right switched positions.

From the mid-1950s until the mid-1980s, conservatives routinely
charged that modern constitutional law "[had] almost nothing to do
with the Constitution and [was] simply a cover for the Supreme
Court's enactment of the political agenda of the American left." 9Then,
as the Court became more conservative under Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the political valences flipped again. Thus, after the Court

stopped the counting of ballots in the 2000 presidential election, hundreds of law professors condemned the five Justices in the majority for'
"acting as political proponents for candidate Bush, not as judges."'
Though professing to represent scholars "of different political beliefs,"

it is difficult to imagine that more than a handful of these law professors voted for Bush. And although conservatives still find it useful to

campaign against liberal judges" and continue to condemn particular
liberal Supreme Court decisions-such as the 2003 invalidation of a
Texas prohibition on same-sex sodomy" -mainstream conservative
figures, for the most part, now find themselves
3 defending the Court
against such charges by liberal and left critics.
8
See Lochner v New York, 198 US 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes dissenting) ("The Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.").
9 Lino A. Graglia, "Constitutional Theory": The Attempted Justificationfor the Supreme
Court's Liberal PoliticalProgram,65 Tex L Rev 789,789 (1987).
10 554 Law Professors Say, NY Times A7 (Jan 13,2001).
11 For example, after a liberal three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals delayed the California gubernatorial recall election on the authority of Bush v Gore, 531 US 98
(2000), but before a conservative eleven-judge en banc panel reversed the panel, the former
chairman of the California Republican Party, Shawn Steel, said, apparently without intended
irony: "We hoped the court was going to be reasonable and at least pretend to follow the law....
This decision was brought down by leftist ideologues It should be apparent to everyone that this
court is out of control." Charlie LeDuff and Nick Madigan, The California Recall: The Candidates;New Twist Brings Anger from Right, NY Times Al (Sept 16,2003).
12 See Lawrence v Texas, 123 S Ct 2472, 2497 (2003) (Scalia dissenting) (contending that
"the Court has taken sides in the culture war, departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that the democratic rules of engagement are observed").
13 For examples of defenses of the Court by mainstream conservatives, see Kenneth W.
Starr, First among Equals: The Supreme Court in American Life (Warner 2002); Marci Hamilton,
The Supreme Court's End of Term Cases:A Demonstration of the Court's Continuing Independ3, 2003), online
at
(July
ence That Proves Commentators Wrong, Writ
(visited Apr 19, 2004) (controverting
http://writ.news.ftndlaw.com/hamilton/20030703.html
"[1]iberal commentators [who] have claimed, over and over again, that the Court is anti-civil
rights, and improperly politicized-and therefore illegitimate"). For a recent attack on conservative judicial activism, see Martin Garbus, Courting Disaster:The Supreme Court and the Unmak-
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Mark Tushnet and the CLS movement'4 do not fit comfortably
into this chronology. CLS scholars joined the attack on objectivity and
rationality at a time-the 1970s"-when most liberals still supported
the Court and were building interpretive theories that would justify
what most conservatives were still decrying as judicial activism. In part
this timing reflected the difference between leftists and liberals. As
leftists, the crits tended to support redistribution through progressive
taxation and a general expansion of the welfare state; while most liberals who supported what Tushnet describes in The New Constitutional Order as "the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order"
also supported the welfare state as a worthwhile political project, they

generally believed that it was not the place of constitutional law to
impose the welfare state through the judiciary." Liberals viewed the
Supreme Court's decisions protecting negative liberty as giving them
all they could reasonably hope to obtain through judicial action, while
crits were often indifferent to these judgments. Given the Court's unwillingness to protect positive rights and the degree to which liberal
rights can be and were used to block progressive regulatory programs," crits had few qualms about undermining a liberal-but-hardlyleft Court.
ing ofAmerican Law (Times 2002). For a more academic version of the liberal critique of judicial
activism (whatever its political slant), see Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Clarendon
1999).
14
Of course, Tushnet does not speak for all crits. Indeed, just over a decade ago, he was accused by his colleague Gary Peller of, among other things, abandoning critical premises just at
the moment when feminists and scholars of color were turning that critique against the academic
enterprise itself. See Gary Peller, The Discourse of ConstitutionalDegradation,81 Georgetown L
J 313, 339 (1992) ("When left academic politics was about demonstrating how misguided mainstream scholars were-how much smarter the left was-critical legal studies and similar organizations were comfortable places for this left faction. Now that the agenda has begun to consider
the social construction of intellectual merit itself, many likely feel threatened."). Moreover,
Tushnet himself has questioned whether there are any core commitments shared by all crits. See
Tushnet, 100 Yale L J at 1516 (cited in note 5) ("[C]ritical legal studies is a political location for a
group of people on the Left who share the project of supporting and extending the domain of
the Left in the legal academy. On this view the project of critical legal studies does not have any
essential intellectual component."). Nonetheless, as the most prominent crit in constitutional law
for over a generation, and a founder of CLS, Tushnet can stand in for the general movement as
well as anybody. Accordingly, throughout this Review, I treat the trajectory of Tushnet's views as
bearing on the CLS movement more broadly.
15
See Tushnet, 100 Yale L J at 1523 (cited in note 5) (placing the origin of CLS as a formal
movement in 1976).
16
See, for example, Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American
Constitution 11 (Harvard 1996) ("Even a judge who believes that abstract justice requires economic equality cannot interpret the equal protection clause as making equality of wealth, or collective ownership of productive resources, a constitutional requirement, because that interpretation simply does not fit American history or practice, or the rest of the Constitution."); Lawrence
G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of ConstitutionalLaw, 88 Nw U L
Rev 410,411 (1993) (observing the "vivid discrepancy between constitutional case law and political justice concern[ing] a particular aspect of our economic life-the welfare of the poor").
17 The most prominent example in the 1970s and 1980s was the way in which procedural
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Moreover, even those crits who were also civil libertarians may
have made a judgment like the one Tushnet made explicitly in his 1999
book, Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts: namely, that over
the long haul, liberals will do better to focus their hopes and energies
on strategies for effecting change through the democratic process than
to look to courts." Given class-based and other biases, judges, in this
view, will more likely stand in the way of, than usher in, progressive
politics. Further, even when courts do act to remedy injustice that the
political process has left untouched -as in the desegregation cases the results disappoint the hopes they inspire.'9 One need not be a crit
to think that judicially decreed progress occurs only when it garners
substantial political support.
Whatever combination of reasons accounts for the fact that crits
have denied the objectivity and rationality of law in good times and
bad, that denial has usually been taken to be definitive of the critical
position. Yet, as Gary Peller put it in 1985, "we are all [legal] realists
now, ' in the sense that virtually no legal scholar believes in the complete objectivity and rationality of law. What then distinguishes a crit
from a conventional legal scholar?
The answer appears to be largely a matter of degree rather than
kind. Tushnet once remarked that "[o]ne could account for perhaps
ninety percent of Chief Justice Rehnquist's bottom-line results by
looking, not at anything in the United States Reports, but rather at the
platforms of the Republican Party."2' As Tushnet was not singling out
Rehnquist as an especially political Justice, we may infer that the 90
percent figure more or less reflects his general view of the proportion
of politics in judicial decisionmaking. That proportion is probably
much higher than the proportion that most mainstream legal academics would ascribe to politics. Certainly, the hundreds of law professors
who objected to what they described as the Supreme Court's partisanship in the 2000 presidential election could not have thought that such
partisanship was par for the course in nine out of ten cases. If they
had, there would have been no cause for outrage.2 More generally,
rights under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Constitution were used to frustrate
agency action. Consider Jerry L. Mashaw and David L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety
(Harvard 1990).
18 See Mark Tushnet, Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts 172 (Princeton 1999)
(claiming that "progressives and liberals are losing more from judicial review than they are
getting").
19 See generally Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? (Chicago 1991) (maintaining that efforts by progressives to use the courts to effect social change have proved largely unsuccessful).
Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 Cal L Rev 1151,1152 (1985).
20
21 Mark V.Tushnet, A Republican ChiefJustice,88 Mich L Rev 1326,1328 (1990), reviewing
Sue Davis, Justice Rehnquist and the Constitution (Princeton 1989).
22
For a contrary view, see Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary between Law
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whereas mainstream legal thought imagines that most laws exhibit a
rather substantial "core of certainty and a penumbra of doubt," the
crits envision only a very small core of legal certainty in a large reservoir of politics.
Accordingly, the crits fare better than postmodernists in other
disciplines. Disbelief in the objectivity of law-as opposed to disbelief
in the objectivity of science or morals-is not a particularly radical or
left-wing position; and though the crits take their disbelief farther than
others in the legal academy, the critical view is probably best characterized as occupying one end of a spectrum rather than as rejecting
fundamental premises, as in other disciplines.
But despite its respectability, critical legal studies must be judged
a failure because of its inability to offer concrete alternatives to
other-more starkly normative-approaches to law, such as law and
economics, process theory, or formalism. The problem is not that
mainstream bodies like Congress and the Supreme Court have rejected the reform project of critical legal studies. The problem is that
there is no such project."
If written before the publication of The New Constitutional Or-

der, the previous sentence would have had to have been qualified in
the following way: the crits had no distinctly legal project, because
they disavowed the idea of anything distinctly legal, but of course they
did have an affirmative project-namely, politics plain and simple. If
law is just politics, then one can either play the law game dishonestly
(which is, after all, the only way it can be played), or one can give up
on it and play the politics game directly.
Tushnet himself successively gave both of these answers. Circa
1981, he said that in the event that the country underwent the sort of
political shift that would enable him to become a Supreme Court Justice, he would cast his votes so as "to advance the cause of socialism"
and then write his opinions "in some currently favored version of
Grand Theory.'

Then, in Taking the Constitution Away from the

Courts, he argued that, in effect, no one should engage in constitu-

and Politics, 110 Yale L J 1407, 1441-47 (2001). Balkin acknowledges that the ability of legal
scholars to criticize Bush v Gore as political suggests a distinction between law and politics but
argues that with more time, the Justices could have fashioned a more persuasive, albeit still politically motivated, opinion; had they done so, he says, the case would have been like any other
opinion setting forth a plausible legal justification for a result actually reached on other, nonlegal
grounds
23 H.L.A. Hart, The Conceptof Law 123 (Clarendon 2d ed 1994).
24
See Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and InstitutionalDesign, 78 NYU L Rev 875,
928 (2003) (arguing that "the left has no program-in the sense of an approach to adjudication
that faithfully seeks to render adjudication legitimate").
25 Mark Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 Ohio St L J 411, 424
(1981).
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tional adjudication, advocating (at least as a rhetorical device) an
amendment rendering the Constitution nonjusticiable, with the result
being that questions now posed as matters of constitutional law would
thereafter be posed as matters of politics. 26
The New Constitutional Order represents a further, and a giant,

step for Tushnet. Now politics itself has become a misleading, largely
futile exercise. When members of Congress debate various policy proposals, they are not so much battling for the supremacy of the social
groups and interests they represent as they are carrying out the hidden logic of the current structure of American politics. The key features of that structure, according to Tushnet, are sharp ideological distinctions between the two major political parties, divided government,
and, as a result of these and other factors, an inability of a governing
majority to agree on major changes. Consequently, a substantial remnant of the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order persists,
while no substantial new legislation is enacted. Given the near certainty of gridlock in the new constitutional order, politics now looks
like law has always looked in the CLS paradigm: a rigged and basically
pointless undertaking.
The balance of this Review proceeds in three parts. Part I summarizes and evaluates The New ConstitutionalOrder's account of con-

temporary American politics. Though the book makes no express
normative claims, it offers descriptive, causal, and predictive claims
about national (and, to a much lesser extent, state and local) politics in
the United States. Tushnet is careful to qualify his predictive claims as
probabilistic, but his descriptive and causal claims do not, for the most
part, come with such disclaimers. He thinks it a fact that American national politics has been chastened, and he appears also to think that
the explanation for such chastening can be found primarily in structural changes in the American political system over the last two or
three decades- such as the substitution of mass primaries for party insider selection mechanisms for selecting candidates. I argue in Part I
that in focusing on political structures to the near-exclusion of popular
attitudes and social movements, Tushnet understates the degree to
which the chastened constitutional order he describes also reflects the
dominant political ideology of the nation as a whole. In other words,
Tushnet downplays the possibility that an important reason the national government does not do many bold new things is that the
American people don't want it to do many bold new things. The onesentence version of this alternative explanation is that the country has
moved to the right; the longer version explains that the country has
moved in multiple directions along multiple axes simultaneously, but
26

Tushnet, Taking the ConstitutionAway from the Courts at 177-94 (cited in note 18).
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that there remains little faith in what people regard as the characteristic institutional form of the New Deal-Great Society constitutional
order: bureaucracy, understood as regulation by centralized command
and control.
Part II canvasses the portions of The New Constitutional Order
that address constitutional law. Tushnet characterizes the jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court as synchronized with the political
branches. As Tushnet explains in the book's preface, he is engaged in
"descriptive sociology" that "link[s] the structure of constitutional
doctrine to some aspects of the way in which political institutions actually operate in the present day" (p ix). Though I find Tushnet's exegesis to be quite illuminating, I question the connection he draws between the Rehnquist Court's constitutional jurisprudence and the new
constitutional order as Tushnet describes it. Just as Part I concludes
that popular preferences have as much to do with the chastening of
the political branches' ambitions, so I contend that those same preferences-filtered through the Justices-account for what Tushnet describes as the relative timidity of the Rehnquist Court. In the judiciary,
as in the political branches, broad social, cultural, and political forces
are as important as structural ones.
Part III examines some implications of Tushnet's descriptive
sociology. Suppose Tushnet is right that large programs of
government-led social reform are no longer on the table. What should
critics of the new constitutional order propose in their stead? The
answer depends on the reason why governmental ambition has been
chastened. If Tushnet is right that the fact of divided and gridlocked
government holds the key, then no substantial reform proposal stands
a chance of being enacted. However, if I am right that hostility to topdown bureaucracy -rather than just gridlock between welfare statists
and watchman statists- accounts for much of the chastening of
government's ambitions, then there is room for activist government
through non-command-and-control institutions. Part III sketches this
alternative.
I. NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

Tushnet uses the term "constitutional order" to mean "a reasonably stable set of institutions through which a nation's fundamental decisions are made over a sustained period, and the principles that guide
those decisions" (p 1). The New Deal-Great Society constitutional order, he says, was characterized by the New Deal commitment of the
federal government to providing the basic needs of all citizens and the
Great Society era's commitment to respecting the civil and political
rights of all persons. Politics in this period was characterized by interest group bargaining.
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The new constitutional order has not exactly repudiated the
commitments of the prior one. Instead, Tushnet says, it has moved
away from command-and-control mechanisms for securing welfare
and individual rights in favor of market-based mechanisms (p 165).
Further, because divided government has replaced interest group bargaining in national politics, the new order does not produce any largescale new legislative initiatives of the sort we saw in the prior era.
Presidents can implement some medium-sized programs because the
very gridlock that prevents Congress from accomplishing much of its
own agenda also limits Congress's ability to block administrative initiatives (pp 25-26), but on the whole, Bill Clinton's 1996 declaration
that "the era of big government is over ' ' "' serves as the rough credo of
the new constitutional order.
Invoking the work of political scientist Stephen Skowronek,2
Tushnet acknowledges that past constitutional orders have tended to
reflect substantive and institutional commitments formed over the
course of years in response to political movements and (typically
presidential) leadership (pp 9-10). It might appear that the same is
true of the current constitutional order. In the twenty-three years
since Ronald Reagan came to power vowing to get government off
the backs of the American people, 2 there has been a substantial shift
in public opinion.
As a first-order approximation, one might say that the political
center has shifted substantially to the right since the mid-1970s. However, it might be more accurate to observe simultaneous movement in
multiple directions. First, a new "Great Awakening" has led to a large
increase in the number of evangelical Christians who, by contrast with
their predecessors who eschewed politics, play an increasingly active
role in politics.'o Christian conservatives exercise considerable power
in national politics and even more power in state and local government-advocating socially conservative positions on issues such as
abortion, church-state separation, and gay rights, even as, on the last of

William J.Clinton, Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Un27
ion, 32 Weekly Comp Pres Doc 90,90 (Jan 23,1996).
28 See Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadershipfrom John Adams to
Bill Clinton (Belknap 1997) (providing a historical survey of the ways in which presidents have
shaped politics).
The precise phrase was actually uttered by Reagan's Vice President, George H.W. Bush.
29
See Remarks of the Vice Presidentat the Annual Republican Senate-House Dinner, 1981 Pub Papers 336, 338. In his first inaugural, Reagan said that he intended to make government "work
with us, not over us; to stand by our side, not ride on our back." InauguralAddress of President
Ronald Reagan, 17 Weekly Comp Pres Doc 1, 3 (Jan 20,1981).
30 See, for example, Elisabeth Bumiller, Evangelicals Sway White House on Human Rights
Issues Abroad, NY Tines § 1 at 1 (Oct 26, 2003).
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these issues, the country as a whole has become more liberal over the
last generation.
Meanwhile, on issues involving the size of government, there has
been a general loss of faith in the ability of conventional bureaucracies to deliver the services they need to provide. Some of this shift in
public opinion may simply be a response to a cynical but effective
strategy of the right: conservative politicians inadequately fund the
agencies charged with serving the public and then point to the agencies' failures as evidence that they should be abolished altogether. But

much of the shift in public opinion may be a response to real limits in
the capacity of centralized bureaucracies to respond effectively to
complex social problems. Whatever the precise admixture of accurate
and manipulated perception, the American people have little stomach
for large new public undertakings.'
Accordingly, although he meant the point ironically, Bill Clinton
was basically correct in characterizing the difference between the
Democratic Party he led and its opponents as the difference between
"Eisenhower Republicans" and "Reagan Republicans." 32 The years
since Clinton made that remark have only seen a consolidation of the
generally rightward trend in American politics, including Newt Gingrich's Contract with America and conservative Republican George
W. Bush's presidency in an era of hyper-patriotism.
3
Tushnet acknowledges the rightward shift of American politics,"
but for the most part he attributes the chastened aspirations of the national government to structural rather than substantive ideological
31 In 1954, 15 percent of respondents told Opinion Research Corp. interviewers that big
business represented the greatest threat to the country, 41 percent said it was big labor, and only
14 percent named big government. In the 2000 Gallup, CNN, and USA Today survey, 65 percent
of respondents saw big government as the greatest threat, followed by big business at 22 percent
and big labor at 7 percent. In Gallup's July 2002 poll, the portion of respondents that named big
government as the greatest threat to the nation had fallen to 47 percent, with 38 percent naming

big business, and 10 percent big labor. Karlyn Bowman, Like Bush, Congress Sees Approval Rat-

ing Decline since Sept. 11, Roll Call (Aug 8,2002). Those numbers still reflect remarkable hostility to government, given that the polls were conducted less than a year after the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, and in the wake of multi-billion dollar corporate scandals. To be sure, hostility to "big government" coexists with broad support for specific government programs, see
John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira, The Emerging DemocraticMajority (Scribner 2002); Christopher
Matthews, Big Government: A Necessary Evil, San Francisco Examiner A21 (Apr 20, 1995), but
what this means is unclear. One possibility is that the popularity of particular programs exists in
the abstract, but that when faced with the dollar costs of such programs, the public's general hostility to government prevails. Another (not necessarily inconsistent) possibility is that progressives have been remarkably ineffective at translating what should be a popular agenda into the
sorts of slogans that conservatives have used to undermine that agenda. See The Rockridge Mission, online at http://www.rockridgeinstitute.org/perspectives/mission (visited May 4, 2004).
32 Bob Woodward, The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House 165 (Simon & Schuster
1994).
33
"[T]he mainstream in the new constitutional order is more conservative than it has been
even in the recent past" (p 105).
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factors. Chief among these is divided government, which itself has
several causes: first, where party leaders formerly chose candidates
with an eye toward capturing median voters, party primaries in which
activists disproportionately participate skew the parties' respective
candidates toward the ideological extremes, making bipartisan consensus on any substantial new government project nearly impossible
to achieve (p 14); second, because of partisan gerrymandering and
voter migration, congressional districts have become politically homogeneous, creating numerous safe seats for ideologues of the right and
left (pp 14-15); third, as candidates have become more dependent on
the national parties for fundraising, the parties have been able to insist
on greater loyalty in Congress, even while individual voters who are
not activists have largely abandoned the parties (pp 16-19); fourth, as
the mass media have assimilated news into the category of entertainment, politicians competing for scarce eyeballs have had to grab the
attention of viewers with sensational moves, inclining them toward
what Tushnet calls "the politics of scandal" (p 21), a further source of
division in national politics; and fifth, middle-of-the-road voters who
are alienated by the extreme positions of polarized parties actually
prefer divided government and vote accordingly (though coordination
problems limit the effectiveness of this approach) (pp 15-16).
The foregoing factors and a few others Tushnet describes combine to ensure divided, and thus chastened, government, but Tushnet
does not suggest that these factors are themselves the manifestation of
some deeper underlying and unifying. cause. He simply identifies a
number of largely unrelated political trends, all of which happen to
lead to divided government. Nonetheless, the trends Tushnet discusses
are strong and longstanding; accordingly, he predicts that divided government will likely persist for a considerable period.
The political science Tushnet ably and succinctly synthesizes in
Chapter One of The New Constitutional Order is basically sound; for
the reasons Tushnet identifies, national politics today is characterized
by greater political polarization than in previous eras. And yet, there
was also something right about Ralph Nader's accusation during the
2000 presidential election that the Democratic and Republican Parties
are better understood as different wings of the same political movement-" -Eisenhower and Reagan Republicans, if you will.
In Tushnet's account, the national government's ambition has
been chastened because the ideologically distant parties cannot agree
on any big new projects. But, at a minimum, this way of characterizing
Nader referred to the two major parties collectively as "Republicrats," deliberately mix34
ing and matching the major party candidates' names as "Gush and Bore." See Sam Howe Verhovek, What Makes Ralph (and Pat) Run?, NY Times § 4 at 5 (Oct 29,2000).
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the current constitutional order overlooks the big new project of dismantling big old projects.
To be sure, Tushnet recognizes that dismantlings happen in the
current era of divided government. Nonetheless, Tushnet does not
fully acknowledge what these dismantlings signify. If the primary
change since the breakdown of the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order were the emergence of divided government, one would
expect the federal government to be unable to create or destroy large
federal programs. The constitutional supermajority requirements for a
change in the status quo would enable Republicans to block new programs while Democrats would preserve old ones. Although we sometimes see this phenomenon-as in fights over environmental deregulation-we also see bipartisan consensus for politically conservative
initiatives: welfare reform-which was signed by a Democratic President-is the most obvious example; the acquiescence by leading Democrats to Bush's massive tax cuts and his costly foreign policy adventure in Iraq, which have greatly exacerbated the federal budget deficit
and thus will ultimately constrain discretionary spending on social
programs, are more recent examples.
Tushnet is correct that the existence of ideologically coherent,
reasonably well-disciplined political parties in Washington prevents
some ambitious political programs that Democrats favor from being
enacted into law, and in that sense, divided government contributes to
the chastened ambitions of the new constitutional order. Yet an equal
if not larger piece of the story may be the overall shift of American
public opinion about the proper role of government bureaucracies in
solving social problems. In short, an important reason why the era of
big government is over is that most Americans and their elected representatives like it that way.
II. JURISPRUDENCE

For someone who would like to take the Constitution away from
the Court, Tushnet devotes an unusually large portion (roughly twothirds) of The New Constitutional Order to Supreme Court cases."

Some of this discussion, such as his account of doctrine governing federal preemption of state legislation and the Court's inference of a constitutional prohibition of federal "commandeering" of state legislatures and executive officials, seems unduly technical given the book's
35 Chapters Two and Four, addressing "The Supreme Court of the New Constitutional Order" and "The Jurisprudence of the New Constitutional Order" respectively, consider Supreme
Court doctrine, and collectively comprise 92 of the book's 172 pages of text; a Chapter titled
"Globalization and the New Constitutional Order" and totaling 23 pages mostly examines how
Supreme Court doctrines of federalism and preemption are affected by globalization.
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overall aims. For the most part, however, Tushnet lucidly explains the
Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence. For example, his succinct account of
the Court's narrow interpretation of congressional power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment (pp 46-55) explains the heart of the controversy for non-specialists without sacrificing nuances that specialists
would find important. That is no mean feat, given the complexity of
this area of the law.
Tushnet's exposition of constitutional doctrine is not merely
descriptive, however. He also advances an interpretive claim. As
against those who see the Rehnquist Court as counter-revolutionary,"
Tushnet views the Court as moderate. In keeping with the zeitgeist of
the new constitutional order, the Court will preserve or at most chip
away at, but not dismantle, the legacy of the New Deal-Great Society
constitutional order, while resisting efforts to extend that legacy.
Tushnet's view is broadly accurate. Consider the federalism cases.
In United States v Lopez 37 and United States v Morrison," the Court
forbade Congress from extending the reach of the Commerce Clause
into what the Court thought was new territory, even as it reaffirmed
the quite broad view of the Commerce power that had been sustained
in the New Deal case of Wickard v Filburn. The Morrison case, as

well as others like it, has also barred Congress from expanding beyond
the Great Society era's conception of fundamental rights by insisting
that when Congress "enforces" the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant
to Section Five of that provision, it must take the Court's understanding of Section One as its starting point. Because that understanding
has not moved much since the 1970s-for example, treating discrimination based on race or sex but not disability as invidious-the
Court's cases accordingly bar Congress from moving much (at least
with respect to authorizing private suits for money damages).
The Rehnquist Court's individual rights cases fit the this-far-andno-further pattern as well." In 1992 41the Court preserved what it called
the "core holding" of Roe v Wade, protecting abortion against previability prohibitions, even as it permitted regulations under a new
"undue burden" standard that would have failed what the Court de36 See, for example, Garbus, Courting Disaster (cited in note 13); John T. Noonan, Jr., Narrowing the Nation's Power: The Supreme CourtSides with the States (California 2002).
37 514 US 549 (1995).
38 529 US 598 (2000).
39
317 US 111 (1942).
See p 67 (quoting James Fleming's characterization of the decision in the right-to-die
40
cases as saying "this far and no further"). See also Washington v Glucksberg,521 US 702 (1997);
James E. Fleming, Fidelity,Basic Liberties, and the Specter of Lochner, 41 Wm & Mary L Rev 147,
152 (1999) ("Glucksberg seems to say 'this far and no further,' while also attempting to gut the
[privacy] precedents of any vitality or generative force.").
41 410 US 113 (1973).

1258

The University of Chicago Law Review

[71:1245

rided as Roe's "rigid trimester framework. 4' Likewise, in 2000 the
Court held that Miranda v Arizona 3 "announced a constitutional rule
that Congress may not supersede legislatively," despite the fact that
intervening cases had cut back on some of Miranda'sbroader implications.4 While refusing wholesale overrulings of its most well-known
individual rights precedents, the Court has also declined to recognize
what it regards as new rights, as in its unanimous 1997 rejection of a
right to physician-assisted suicide.46
Accordingly, in the context of both powers and rights, the Court's
cases parallel the trend Tushnet sees in Congress. They chip away at
the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order, but do not fundamentally reject its commitments.
Tushnet begins his longest chapter on the Court with the observation that "[t]he Supreme Court could do essentially anything its majority wanted in a regime of divided government" (p 33). Except in the
unusual circumstances in which one party controls both houses of
Congress and the presidency (as is true at the present moment, albeit
just barely), on questions of statutory interpretation there will rarely
be the political will to overrule the Court's decisions; and, in matters
of constitutional law, the supermajority of both houses of Congress
and the state legislatures needed to overrule the Court will almost
never be found. So Tushnet is correct that the Court is practically omnipotent, but this raises the question of why the Court has used its
near-omnipotence in a way that mirrors the this-far-and-no-further attitude of Congress. Why, in other words, is the Rehnquist Court only
moderately conservative rather than counter-revolutionary?
In answering this question, Tushnet gestures toward the appointment process. When the presidency and the Senate are in the hands of
different parties-and indeed, given the possibility of a filibuster, even
when they are in the hands of the same party but the majority party in
the Senate holds fewer than sixty seats-moderates are much more
likely to end up on the Supreme Court than strongly conservative or
liberal Justices (pp 103-06). Given that Supreme Court vacancies are
rare events, Tushnet acknowledges the possibility of ideological appointments, but he thinks the current moderately conservative Court
to be more or less what one would expect from the new constitutional
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833,873 (1992).
384 US 436 (1966).
44 Dickerson v United States, 530 US 428,444 (2000).
45 See Michael C. Dorf and Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 S Ct
Rev 61, 76-80 (arguing that "some post-Miranda decisions clearly are defensible" while others
are "more dubious").
46 See Glucksberg, 521 US 702; Vacco v Quill, 521 US 793 (1997) (holding that New York's
prohibition on assisting suicide did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
42

43
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order. To be more precise, in Tushnet's view, the Court's median Justice-Sandra Day O'Connor or, depending on the issue, Anthony M.
Kennedy-personifies the new constitutional order.
Tushnet's argument appears to be missing a step. Once on the
Court, why would the typical median Justice-who is, recall, essentially omnipotent -want to fashion doctrine that fits the new constitutional order, given that, in Tushnet's view, the latter is not a coherent
ideological program but simply the result of political gridlock? Why
not fashion his or her own ideologically coherent, albeit politically
moderate, set of doctrines?
One possibility, which Tushnet rejects, is that constitutional orders
have normative force that judges must respect. Aficionados of constitutional theory will be struck by the siimilarity between Tushnet's pro-

ject in The New ConstitutionalOrder and Bruce Ackerman's effort to

divide American constitutional history into discrete periods separated
by "constitutional moments." 7 The very idea of a "constitutional order" suggests that the Constitution we have is not, as in conventional
accounts, the one bequeathed to us by the Framers, but something that
has been reconstructed again and again-and not just by formal
amendment. As Tushnet himself notes, however, there is an important
distinction between his approach and Ackerman's.
Ackerman's constitutional moments-the Founding, the Reconstruction, and the New Deal-are periods of heightened political activity that (according to Ackerman) lead to dramatic shifts in the constitutional order. Much of the theoretical apparatus Ackerman develops in the two volumes of We the People he has published thus far 4 is
designed to distinguish between, on the one hand, successful constitutional moments that result in express or implicit changes in the Constitution, and, on the other hand, ordinary politics and failed constitutional moments that leave the prior regime intact. The distinction is
important for Ackerman because his ultimate aim is to reconcile nonoriginalist judicial interpretation of the Constitution with an account
of popular sovereignty in which neither ordinary politics nor judicial
creativity suffices to change the Constitution. For Ackerman, the solution is synthesis: what may appear to the untrained eye as judge-made
constitutional law is better understood, he argues, as an effort by the
Justices to synthesize the constitutional commitments forged by the
People themselves during the Founding, the Reconstruction, and the
New Deal. The criteria for distinguishing constitutional moments from

47 See Bruce A. Ackerman, Discoveringthe Constitution,93 Yale L J 1013,1022 (1984) (describing the occurrence of "constitutional moments" amid "normal politics").
48 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations(Harvard 1991); Bruce Ackerman, We the
People: Transformations(Harvard 1998).
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ordinary politics enable the (Ackermanian) judge to identify the commitments that she believes herself duty-bound to respect.
Tushnet, by contrast, has no interest in legitimating judicial review or in preserving any distinction between plebiscitarian democracy and the sort of dualism -constitutional moments versus ordinary
politics-that Ackerman favors. Accordingly, Tushnet's notion of a
constitutional order is somewhat fuzzier than Ackerman's. We can slip
from one Tushnetian constitutional order to another gradually, without any great political upheaval, and even without anybody really noticing. More importantly for our purposes, the transition from one
constitutional order to another places no interpretive obligations on
judges. Knowing that we inhabit one rather than another constitutional order is useful for analyzing how political and judicial actors
behave, but, to borrow H.L.A. Hart's terminology, that knowledge
need not play any "internal" role in a judge's or other government official's decisionmaking."'
To be sure, it is possible that the current and likely future median
Justices would disagree with Tushnet. Might they think, on Ackermanian or other grounds, that they are duty-bound to respect the principles of the new constitutional order? If so, then that fact itself could
be incorporated into Tushnet's account of the new constitutional order: a principle of the new constitutional order would then be that
judges (for bad reasons) believe themselves bound to respect the constitutional order that characterizes the political branches. Although
this is a theoretical possibility, it is a complete nonstarter as an account
of what the current Supreme Court Justices actually think. As Tushnet
himself notes, the "[o]ne theme [that] runs through the modern
Court's decisions . . . is suspicion of a legislative process in which
...politicians engage in grandstanding for their constituents, adopting
legislation that seems 'good' in the abstract but that has no decent policy justification" (p 94). How likely is it that a Court with this view of
Congress would treat the very pathologies that lead to congressional
grandstanding as legal meta-principles commanding judicial respect?
If the new constitutional order does not directly command the
Justices' respect, there remains the possibility that it does so indirectly.
The sort of person most likely to survive the appointment process in
periods of divided government, the argument goes, will be a moderate
in the sense that her views on specific controversial questions such as
abortion, affirmative action, federalism, gay rights, the right to die, and
separation of church and state are within a standard deviation of the
midpoint of public opinion. In addition, such a person will likely be a
methodological moderate without a coherent judicial philosophy,
49

Hart, Concept of Law at 89 (cited in note 23).
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muddling through on a case-by-case basis rather than articulating and
applying a unifying approach to the law. Among other things, such a
methodological eclectic can more credibly answer senators' questions
about how she decides a case in a way that provides few hints to how
she would resolve specific controversial issues, and thus avoid the opposition likely to be triggered by a judicial nominee with strong methodological commitments that are likely to be read as signaling views
on concrete controversies.
The foregoing argument-which is at least implicit in The New
Constitutional Order-looks unassailable. But it also looks banal. Do
we really need an account of anything so grand as a constitutional order to conclude that the Supreme Court will generally have views that
are close to the middle of American public opinion? Mr. Dooley
didn't.'
Moreover, if I have correctly identified the mechanism by which
median Supreme Court Justices are usually chosen, Tushnet's talk of a
new constitutional order is not merely unnecessary; it is also misleading. The new constitutional order that Tushnet describes says "this far
and no further" because that is what gridlock entails. It is true, as I
noted above, that much of the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence takes
the this-far-and-no-further form. However, some of it does not.
2
Consider, for example, last term's decision in Lawrence v Texas,
3 The majority opinion of Justice
which overruled Bowers v Hardwick.
Kennedy in Lawrence contended that Hardwick "was not correct
when it was decided,""' and argued at some length that the Hardwick
Court reached the wrong decision based on the material available to it
at the time. But precisely because the relevant material was available
to the Hardwick Court in 1986, outside observers can legitimately ask
why the Court saw the issue differently in 2003.
The decision in Lawrence was handed down after the publication
of The New Constitutional Order, and so Tushnet does not discuss the
case. Nonetheless, insofar as The New ConstitutionalOrder directs our
attention to judicial appointments as the principal means by which the
Court is connected to the political process, we can readily imagine
50 Tushnet cites favorably the work of Cass Sunstein describing the Rehnquist Court this
way (pp 130-38) (discussing Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the
Supreme Court (Harvard 1999)). See also Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, Desperately
Seeking Certainty: The Misguided Quest for Constitutional Foundations (Chicago 2002) (providing a similarly anti-theoretical account of constitutional adjudication as a form of muddling
through).
51
See Finley Peter Dunne, Mr.Dooley's Opinions 26 (R.H. Russell 1901) ("[T]h' supreme
court follows th' iliction returns.").
52
123 S Ct 2472 (2003).
53 478 US 186 (1986).
54 Lawrence, 123 S Ct at 2484.
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how Tushnet might answer the question of what happened between
1986 and 2003: the Court's personnel had changed.
Yet under close inspection, this answer is inadequate. To be sure,
the only remaining Hardwick dissenter, Justice Stevens, was in the majority in Lawrence, as were the two Democratic appointees to the
Court, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer. But the remaining members of
the Lawrence majority, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, were
all Republican nominees to the Court, and one of them, Justice
O'Connor, had been a member of the Hardwick majority.
It is possible that Kennedy and Souter thought Hardwick should
be overruled from the moment they were appointed, although Souter
espoused a modest view of substantive due process in his confirmation
hearings, suggesting that, circa 1990, he would have been unlikely to
reject Hardwick's then-recent rule.5 But, in any event, what about
O'Connor? She only concurred in the judgment in Lawrence on the
ground that the Texas prohibition of same-sex sodomy violated the
Equal Protection Clause. This maneuver permitted her to maintain the
fiction that her votes in the two cases were not inconsistent-a fiction
because, in Hardwick, it was the Court itself that introduced the distinction between heterosexual and homosexual sodomy; the Georgia
statute at issue there did not single out same-sex conduct. Thus if the
distinction violated Equal Protection all along, then Justice O'Connor
had no business joining Justice White's majority opinion in Hardwick.
The more plausible explanation is that Justice O'Connor changed her
mind between 1986 and 2003.
Why did Justice O'Connor change her mind? A certain kind of
what-the-judge-had-for-breakfast legal realist might be interested in
knowing about O'Connor's personal experiences and relationships,
but there is another version of legal realism-what might be called
"sociological legal realism" -that calls attention instead to broader
social trends. 6 We need not wonder about what exactly happened to
55
Souter would not even commit himself to the proposition that the substantive due process right of married couples to use contraceptives that was recognized in Griswold v Connecticut,
381 US 479 (1965), extended to unmarried couples. See Linda Greenhouse, Defining Souter,
Some; Undogmatic Middle-of-the-Road Nominee Is Surprisefor Liberals and Conservatives,NY
Times Al (Sept 19, 1990). Souter's caginess did not require him to call into question any of the
Court's precedents, however, because Eisenstadt v Baird,405 US 438 (1972), which is often understood as extending Griswold to unmarried couples, and which contains sweeping language
about individual rights, see id at 453, was nominally an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, rather than its Due Process Clause.
56
Based on her reading of private correspondence, N.E.H. Hull has noted that Karl Llewellyn sought to distance legal realism from the sociological jurisprudence of figures such as
Roscoe Pound. See N.E.H. Hull, Some Realism about the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange over Realism: The Newly Uncovered Private Correspondence,1927-1931, 1987 Wis L Rev 921, 964-66. In
contrast, Neil Duxbury has argued that "there are no good historical or conceptual reasons for
demarcating the pre-realists from the realists, and that realism should, accordingly, be regarded
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O'Connor or, for that matter, to Kennedy and Souter. We can look in-

stead to changes in social attitudes about homosexuality and sodomy.
Indeed, the Lawrence opinion does just that, noting that since the
Court's decision in Hardwick, twelve of the twenty-five states that
criminalized sodomy had eliminated their prohibitions." In this respect, the case parallels the Court's decision of a year earlier in Atkins

v Virginia,' holding that execution of the mentally retarded, which it
had deemed permissible in 1989, was unconstitutional because of a
state trend toward abolition of the practice. Nor must we confine our
attention to changes in positive law. As Jack Balkin observes, the exis-

tence of a highly rated network sitcom featuring a gay protagonist exmuch about the result in Lawrence as anything in the written
plains• as
• 59
opinion.

The foregoing is, as I have indicated, good old-fashioned legal re-

alism of the sort that a crit like Tushnet would have endorsed in his
youth-and which, for all I know, he still endorses. And yet note how

this account of the Lawrence case makes the new constitutional order

in national politics irrelevant, except perhaps to the extent that both

the Court's opinion and, say, the flak that Senator Rick Santorum took
for his equating same-sex intimacy with polygamy, incest, and adultery,60 are epiphenomena of the same underlying change in social attitudes. In Lawrence-and in many other cases that I won't bother de-

tailing-it's not the gridlock that results from the structural forces
Tushnet identifies as central to the new constitutional order that
drives the Court. It's the underlying social attitudes that may or may
not find expression in the output of the political branches.

as the continuation of a particular trend-namely, the growing dissatisfaction with legal formalism-rather than as the beginning of something substantively new." Neil Duxbury, Patterns of
American Jurisprudence77 (Clarendon 1995). In using the term "sociological legal realism," I do
not necessarily mean to take Duxbury's side in the debate over the relation between sociological
jurisprudence and legal realism. Rather, I mean to emphasize the role that the social-as opposed to the personal-played in legal realists' account of judicial decisionmaking.
57 See Lawrence, 123 S Ct at 2481.
58 534 US 1122 (2002).
59 See Jack M. Balkin, What Does Lawrence v. Texas Hold?, online at http://
balkin.blogspot.comI2003_06_29 balkin_archive.html (visited May 4,2004):
[O]nce Will and Grace becomes a Top Ten show in the Nielsen ratings, we may assume that
gays have achieved a basic degree of acceptance in American society, even if they are not
treated equally in all respects. What courts do in these fundamental rights cases is reflect
changing social mores that are worked out in political struggles about basic values and then
translated into constitutional doctrine.
60

See G.O.P Senator's Remark on Gays Draws Fire, NY Times A21 (Apr 22,2003).
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III. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

The crits used to have an answer to the charge that they lacked
an affirmative program: by exposing the ways in which the legal system masks the exercise of raw power, CLS aimed to discredit the law's
authority, thus paving the way for, if not exactly a revolution, at least a
large-scale reorientation of law and politics. For example, in a seminal
article, Joseph Singer argued that the revelation that law is simply
politics "should be experienced as empowering."'" Scholars, lawyers,
and activists who used to worry that judges and others ought not conflate the law with their political preferences were liberated to pursue
politics in judicial as well as other, more conventionally political, fora.
Set against this backdrop, The New ConstitutionalOrder sounds a

death knell for CLS. Tushnet continues to believe that law is simply
politics, but now politics itself is largely futile. There is nothing wrong
with pursuing political aims through litigation, regulation, or legislation. But it is largely a sucker's game.
To be sure, Tushnet acknowledges that a few ultra-conservative
appointments to the Supreme Court could tilt that body in a truly
counter-revolutionary direction (p 35), but without exactly saying that
liberals who fret over this possibility are so many Chicken Littles, he
reassures the reader that the judicial appointment process under conditions of divided government makes it quite unlikely.
Similarly, Tushnet implies that there will rarely be any point in
making substantial proposals to Congress because-and this is the
whole point of the book, it seems-in the current constitutional order,
Congress will not enact anything other than feel-good measures. Nor
need activists worry much that Congress will dismantle the rump of
the old constitutional order, because "[t]he new constitutional order
remains committed to preserving a baseline of New Deal-Great Society protections for some quality-of-life programs, such as environmental protection, some aspects of the social safety net, such as the
social security program, and a fair amount of pluralistic tolerance"
(p 32).
How about the states? In an era of devolution, might architects of
social change concentrate their energy there? Tushnet argues that as a
result of the mobility of capital and the anti-tax movement, states lack
the resources to fund any substantial new projects (p 28). Moreover,
because term limits in many states force legislators to seek higher office almost from the moment they come to power, state legislatures
rarely undertake important projects anymore, and what they do undertake is often carried out incompetently (p 29).
61

Joseph William Singer, The Playerand the Cards:Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale L J

1,62 (1984).
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If you thought you could take your case directly to your fellow
citizens, changing public attitudes in a way that would force your
elected representatives to stand up and take notice, think again. You
may be able to find some like-minded folks via the Internet, but to
grab the attention of the general public you will need access to the
mass media, which is interested only in infotainment. Changing public
opinion on a massive scale will work only if packaged as part of a
blockbuster Hollywood film (pp 19-22).
One is left to wonder, therefore, why a talented person of the left
(or the right) who wanted to influence the real world would spend his
time writing law review articles and scholarly books rather than
screenplays. Aside from the difficulty of making a political film entertaining, 2 for Tushnet the answer appears to be simply habit. Having
come of age in an era when critical positive analysis of law and legal
institutions indirectly served justice by revealing their defects, he continues in that vein even when it serves primarily as a form of therapy.
This is not to say that Tushnet exactly counsels indolence. Though
the new constitutional order may assure moderation in the long run, a
reader of Tushnet's book as well as the newspaper might be mindful of
Keynes's aphorism ("In the long run we are all dead") and accordingly worry that with one or two more Supreme Court appointments,
all branches of the federal government will be prepared to dismantle
permanently much of the progressive legacy of the New Deal and
Great Society. Someone worried about this possibility-which is not
ruled out by Tushnet's analysis-might well think that the best use of
her energies is to fight to preserve as much as possible of the New
Deal-Great Society constitutional order as she can. If focused on the
courts, the goal would be, as the American Constitution Society mission statement puts it, "to restore the fundamental principles of respect for human dignity, protection of individual rights and liberties,
genuine equality, and access to justice to their rightful - and traditionally central-place in American law."6'
But if the goal is to defend the Warren Court against the
Rehnquist (or Thomas or Ashcroft!) Court, crits are ill-prepared for
the task. From the beginning, critical legal studies has aimed to unmask terms like "human dignity" and "genuine equality" as just so
much metaphysical nonsense disguising the exercise of raw political
power. A crit who is dismayed, on ideological grounds, about the potential rightward drift of the Court would have to follow Tushnet's adThink of "socialist realism" in the old Soviet Union.
John Maynard Keynes, A Tract on Monetary Reform, in 4 The Collected Writings of John
Maynard Keynes 1, 65 (Macmillan 1971).
64 American Constitution Society, Goals, online at http://www.acslaw.org/about (visited
May 4,2004).
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vice circa 1981: pretend that the law really does mandate your preferred political program."

Of course, members of the American Constitution Society and
other mainstream liberals need not engage in any pretense, for mainstream liberals tend not to be crits. They really believe that the Constitution, best understood, entails most of the positions of the John Kerry
for President campaign-just as mainstream conservatives seem to believe that it entails the Bush campaign's platform. The problem to
which I would call attention is not so much the conflation of legal and
political views. In a post-Legal Realist world, even non-crits recognize
that these are not hermetically sealed domains. The problem is that
groups like the American Constitution Society are selling an agendathe New Deal-Great Society constitutional order-that the public
isn't buying.
Tushnet sees the problem. In the final chapter of The New Constitutional Order he identifies the sort of activist regulatory programs
that could succeed in the current era of skepticism of government activism. These programs come in two types. The 1990 Clean Air Act
amendments -which substitute a market in pollution emission credits
for requirements of specific technology or specific emissions limitstypify the first "deinstitutionalized" form of regulation. So too do a
slew of recent proposals by Bruce Ackerman and various co-authors
that aim to accomplish traditional left/liberal goals through forms of
private ordering: one-shot redistribution of wealth to convert impoverished citizens into "stakeholders";6 "patriot dollars" that will
counter the impact of real dollars on the system of campaign finance; 6'
and one day of (paid) deliberation by citizens who otherwise would
(and do) cast uninformed ballots."
Tushnet focuses mostly on a second form of regulation, what
Charles Sabel and I (and others) have called "democratic experimentalism,"' which Tushnet graciously calls "the most promising candidate
for a theory of government activity in the new constitutional order"
(pp 171-72). In very broad outline, democratic experimentalism
names a system of decentralized yet centrally monitored government
See note 25.
See generally Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott, The StakeholderSociety (Yale 1999).
67
See generally Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres, Voting with Dollars:A New Paradigmfor
Campaign Finance (Yale 2002).
68 See generally Bruce Ackerman and James S. Fishkin, DeliberationDay (Yale 2004).
69 See Michael C. Dorf and Charles F Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Colum L Rev 267 (1998) (setting forth a comprehensive account of democratic experimentalism). For a list of works within the rubric of democratic experimentalism, see Michael C.
Dorf, Legal Indeterminacyand InstitutionalDesign, 78 NYU L Rev 875,885 n 29 (2003). See also
Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, DestabilizationRights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv L Rev 1015 (2004).
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in which local, democratically accountable units are free to set goals
and to choose the means to attain them. Concurrently, legislative bodies or regulatory agencies set and ensure compliance with framework
objectives. These framework objectives shape and in turn are shaped
by means of performance standards based on information about current best practices that regulated entities provide in return for the
freedom to experiment with solutions they prefer.
Consider an extremely condensed but real example that illustrates how democratic experimentalism differs from both stereotypical regulation and deregulation: the regulation of air quality. In (a
somewhat stylized version of) the traditional regulatory paradigmthat is, the New Deal-Great Society constitutional orderenvironmentalists would lobby for strict limits in Congress or an administrative agency that had been delegated the relevant power by
Congress, while industry (and perhaps organized labor) would lobby
for weak or no limits. The end result of this process would be either no
regulation or a more-or-less once-and-for-all limit based on either a
political compromise or a scientific judgment that would likely be obsolete by the time it was implemented (especially if the relevant limit
were set by agency rulemaking subject to the laborious process of judicial review).
How does democratic experimentalist regulation of air quality
differ? Consider the actual Clean Air Act.0 Although many of its key
provisions took shape during the heyday of the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order, 1 in important respects the Act is nonetheless an example of experimentalist regulation. Congress established a
very general overarching goal-air quality at a level "requisite to protect the public health""-and instructed the federal Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to set minimum air quality performance
targets compatible with that goal. 3 Requiring that the agency learn
from experience, the Act provides that both the list of regulated pollutants and the performance targets ("National Ambient Air Quality
Standards" or "NAAQS") are to be revised periodically in light of expert opinion and the experience of the states in adapting national
standards to local conditions." The states in turn have primary respon42 USC § 7401 et seq (2000).
The first Clean Air Act was adopted in 1963 as Pub L No 88-206,77 Stat 392 (1963). It
was amended in 1967 by the Air Quality Act, Pub L No 90-148, 81 Stat 485 (1967), substantially
amended by the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub L No 91-604,84 Stat 1676, and periodically
amended again in the ensuing years.
72 42 USC § 7409(b)(1).
73 See 42 USC § 7409(a)(1).
74 See 42 USC § 7408(a)(1) (requiring the Administrator to "publish, and ... from time to
time thereafter revise, a list" of pollutants subject to regulation); 42 USC § 7409(d)(2)(A) (mandating that at least one of the seven members of the statutorily required scientific review com70
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sibility for ensuring that air quality within their territories meets the
EPA's standards." They are free to devise whatever mix of regulations,
incentives, voluntary measures, land use restrictions, alternative transportation plans, and other means that they believe will best achieve
the performance targets in their regions, tailoring policy mixes to reflect locally varying economic and environmental conditions. 6 States
are also free to set their own more ambitious air quality targets if they
so choose, but they must, at a minimum, meet the national target." In
exchange for this broad grant of authority, the states must provide detailed reports to the EPA on their plans as well as on actual air quality
performance and progress toward achieving the targets, derived from
air quality monitoring in each region. The EPA retains power to review and approve the regional plans, to reject any it believes likely to
fall short of achieving the national performance targets, and to demand revisions if a currently operative plan falls short of improvement goals. If a state fails to submit plans, submits incomplete or substantively inadequate plans, or repeatedly defaults on its performance
obligations, the EPA is authorized to step in and devise and implement its own plan to achieve air quality performance goals in the defaulting region. 7
Cooperative federalism of the sort embodied in the Clean Air
Act is not a perfect exemplar of democratic experimentalism. For example, though it requires state consultation with local political authorities,9 it does not guarantee rights of participation for stakeholders such as labor and industry representatives, environmental
nongovernmental organizations, and other activist groups that might
be enlisted in the formulation, implementation, and refinement of
state and local standards. Still, it sufficiently illustrates the experimentalist paradigm to answer the objection that democratic experimentalism is a purely theoretical construct.
To be clear, Tushnet does not exactly raise the objection just addressed. He thinks that experimentalism is real enough and that it fits
the chastened ambitions of the new constitutional order because "democratic experimentalist initiatives emerge when there is a consensus
that something needs to be done but the array of political forces
makes it impossible for the political system to produce results consistent with the wishes of any particular side" (p 169). That is true, but
mittee that periodically reviews ambient air quality standards "represent State air pollution
control agencies").
75
See 42 USC § 7407(a) (assigning to states "the primary responsibility" for air quality).
76
See id; 42 USC § 7410(a)(2) (setting forth the necessary elements of a state plan).
77
Id.
78
See generally 42 USC § 7410.
79
42 USC § 7410(a)(2)(M).
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Tushnet's formulation of this advantage suggests that democratic experimentalism is primarily a vehicle for circumventing gridlock. But it
is more. Tushnet imagines that gridlock arises from a clash between interest groups or ideologues, who know what they want, if only they
could get their hands on the levers of power. Yet we democratic experimentalists consistently emphasize that in the conditions of modern life, people increasingly find that their problem is not so much an
inability to persuade those with different interests or viewpoints of
what to do; their problem is that no one has a complete solution to
what collectively ails them. Democratic experimentalism posits that
people with diverse interests and viewpoints can come together to
solve their common problems by deliberating rather than simply negotiating. We suggest that various stakeholders have not only stakes
but also local knowledge, and that by pooling their knowledge they
can collectively discover opportunities that individually they would
miss.
Tushnet tempers his enthusiasm for democratic experimentalism
in a number of ways. To begin, he questions whether it actually works.
Some of its provisional successes, he says, may simply be examples of
the "Hawthorne Effect," in which participants in a study temporarily
improve their performance simply because they are being studied.
Once the novelty wears off, so do the improvements (p 170).
Yet the Hawthorne Effect, named for studies conducted at Western Electric's Hawthorne Works in Chicago, has been debunked as
resting on a flawed interpretation of the original data.' ° Moreover,
even if one accepted Tushnet's account of the Hawthorne Effect-the
notion that improvements in performance occurred "because the
workers knew they were participating in an experiment" (p 170)-that
would hardly count as an argument against democratic experimentalism. The whole point of democratic experimentalism is for actors to
feel -correctly

-that

they are always participatingin an experiment.

Accordingly, if there were a Hawthorne Effect of the sort Tushnet invokes, democratic experimentalism would institutionalize it.
Indeed, one can go further still. Paul Blumberg, who undertook a
careful re-analysis of the Hawthorne studies, concluded that they in
fact demonstrated a phenomenon quite conducive to democratic experimentalism: workers who are given a voice in the production process outperform workers commanded to follow orders from hierarchical superiors.8' That lesson, of course, underlies the transformation
from Fordist assembly-line production to flexible specialization that
80 See Thomas E Gilbert, Human Competence: Engineering Worthy Performance 183-84
(McGraw-Hill 1979); H.M. Parsons, What Happenedat Hawthorne?,183 Science 922 (Mar 1974).
81 See Paul Blumberg, Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of Participation 34-35

(Schocken 1969).
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has been occurring in the last two decades. Elsewhere, Sabel and I
have explained the homology between flexible specialization and democratic experimentalism, but one can object to parallels between
private and public sector forms of organization while still seeing the
relevance of the real Hawthorne Effect for the latter: bureaucracies
that carry out detailed, centrally selected directives will operate less
effectively than looser organizations that give those on the front
lines-such as agency staff, local units of government, and affected
citizens -a substantial role in implementing, and thereby customizing,
public policy."
Nonetheless, Tushnet is right that the jury is still out on most of
the main examples of democratic experimentalism. The next round of
inquiry should undertake detailed and rigorous analysis of the performance of systems of regulation that can be fairly characterized as
fitting the democratic experimentalist paradigm.
Tushnet's chief misgiving is that democratic experimentalism may
be parasitic on a system of national politics that will typically be hostile to it. In its full realization, Tushnet says, and I agree, democratic
experimentalism is a big new government program. It requires Congress to enact regulatory goals and to ensure rights of participation in
stakeholder processes. Yet, Tushnet reminds us, Congress is unlikely to
adopt big new government programs in the new constitutional order.
So democratic experimentalism will likely be limited to a number of
interesting projects of dubious legality operating at the margins of the
gridlocked administrative state.
Suppose, however, that, as I argued in Part I, Tushnet's causal account of the chastened ambitions of the new constitutional order is
wrong. Suppose, in other words, that the reason Congress doesn't enact any major new regulatory programs has more to do with popular
opposition to such programs than with the structural factors that he
observes lead to divided government. The question we must then ask
is, why don't Americans want the government to undertake (m)any
large new programs?m
One possibility is that Americans have become Nozickian minimalists about government on the sort of grounds that one would see
See Dorf and Sabel, 98 Colum L Rev at 314-23 (cited in note 69).
Perhaps Americans do want their government to undertake a few new large programs,
such as combating terrorism and reforming public education. In the case of the latter, however,
the form of the federal effort-the No Child Left Behind Act, Pub L No 107-110, 115 Stat 1425
(2002), codified at 20 USC §§ 6301-6578-fits the democratic experimentalist paradigm, although it has other flaws. See generally James S. Liebman and Charles F. Sabel, The FederalNo
Child Left Behind Act and the Post-desegregationCivil Rights Agenda, 81 NC L Rev 1703, 1703
(2003) (maintaining that the No Child Left Behind Act "trigger[s] just the kind of locally, experientially, and consensually generated standards whose absence has kept courts from carrying
through with their initial commitments to desegregated, educationally effective schools").
82
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urged in publications of the Cato Institute. But consider another possibility that seems more likely to be true: Americans still want the
government to tackle large problems; they just don't want government
to tackle these problems via the characteristic institutional form of the
New Deal-Great Society constitutional order, namely, bureaucracy. If
this interpretation of mainstream public opinion is correct, the public,
and therefore Congress, would be willing, perhaps even eager, to enact
the sort of framework legislation necessary to implement democratic
experimentalism. Perhaps I'm wrong in these judgments, but if the
only alternative is a counsel of despair, where's the harm in putting
them to the test?
CONCLUSION

The New Constitutional Order is a fastidiously austere book.

Tushnet avoids any expressly normative analysis, sticking to what he
quite accurately describes as a project of "descriptive sociology" (p ix).
And yet one cannot help but read between the lines a certain sadness
on his part at the passing of the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order. Though Tushnet may shed no tears for the decline of the
Warren Court-which rooted so many of its decisions in a jurisprudential philosophy that Tushnet considers only so much window dressing for political judgments-he seems to feel a far greater attachment
to the actual political accomplishments of FDR, LBJ, and the Congresses with which they collaborated.
Precisely why Tushnet and others on the legal left may feel an
attachment to the archetypal institutional forms of the New DealGreat Society period is largely beyond the scope of this Review, but I
would suggest two reasons. First, as a matter of historical fact, during
the New Deal-Great Society period, the Democratic Party played the
dominant role in national politics, and pursued substantive policy aims
that, while falling far short of social democracy in other parts of the
world, were, by contrast with the policies pursued in the preceding and
following periods, on balance progressive. For left-leaning American
legal scholars, top-down bureaucracy may benefit from "innocence by
association" with the substantive goals of the New Deal-Great Society
period.
Second, as the heirs of legal realism, crits like Tushnet may share
the legal realists' view that, relative to the formalisms of common-law
reasoning, administrative agencies can flexibly bring to bear scientific
expertise on social problems without the constraint of unduly backward-looking and status-quo-preserving formal doctrine.1 Today, of
8
See Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability, Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 Colum L Rev
531,546-48 (1998).
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course, common parlance associates bureaucracy with rigid rules apnew,85
plied unthinkingly, and while that view of bureaucracy is hardly
for the legal realist predecessors of the critical legal studies move-

ment, the rigidities of bureaucracy were less salient than its perceived
advantages over the common law.

Regardless of whether and to what extent these factors account
for Tushnet's apparent sentimental attachment to bureaucracy, it is
that attachment, I think, that leads him to see the eclipse of the New

Deal-Great Society constitutional order as largely a byproduct of
structural political forces that, through sheer bad luck, have led to

congressional gridlock. Were Tushnet less attached to (the political
manifestations of) the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order,
he might be more willing to see its decline as also manifesting popular

preferences that reflect a dissatisfaction with its characteristic institutional form.
In a sense, Tushnet's difficulty is that he has become too much of
a conventional American political scientist and too little of a Marxist.

As a political scientist, he looks to voting rules, party practices, and the
like for the determinants of the political zeitgeist. These factors no
doubt matter a great deal, but a Marxist would say that they play a

subordinate role to the main currents of social and economic organization. In the private sector and increasingly in the public sector, those
currents now flow away from the hierarchical bureaucracy typical of
the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order.8
Where do those currents flow to? It is too early to say. Powerful
forces now seek to resurrect laissez-faire capitalism on the ruins of the
85
See Franz Kafka, The Castle (Knopf 1941). As Jerry Mashaw has noted, "Kafka gained
many of his impressions of administrative processes as a bureaucrat in an agency dispensing disability benefits." Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security Disability
Claims 91 n 9 (Yale 1983).
86 To extend the metaphor, perhaps the organizational pattern might better be viewed as
an estuary, which, though it on balance flows downstream, also flows upstream. Thus, even as
support for public bureaucracies has dwindled, and even as much of the private sector has
moved from mass production to "flexible specialization," Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel,
The Second IndustrialDivide: Possibilitiesfor Prosperity (Basic 1984), some of the retrenchment
in public bureaucracies has been accompanied by growth in private bureaucracies that serve
parallel functions by much the same top-down methods as the old public institutions. See, for example, Jacob S. Hacker, The Divided Welfare State: The Battle over Private and Public Social
Benefits in the United States 124-73 (Cambridge 2002) (discussing the relation between the private pension system and the public social security system). In this respect, it is worth remarking
that where, as in the case of health insurance, private bureaucracies are no better (and probably
worse) at delivering services without red tape, the private bureaucracies are unpopular as well.
See Phyllis C. Borzi, Distinguishing between Coverage and Treatment Decisions under ERISA
Health Plans:What's Left of ERISA Preemption?,49 Buff L Rev 1219,1220-21 (2001) (observing
that the same public worries about treatment decisions being made by government bureaucrats
that were exploited to defeat the Clinton health care plan have resurfaced as anxieties about
treatment decisions being made by private bureaucrats working for health maintenance
organizations).
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administrative state. There are, however, alternatives, both of the sort
that Ackerman and his co-authors have proposed and the sort that
Sabel, I, and our co-authors have proposed. Tushnet apparently sees
each of these alternatives as inferior to the sort of activist government
that the new constitutional order precludes; given that our political
system is (in his view) unfortunately unwilling to extend the New
Deal-Great Society constitutional order, second-best projects like
market-based regulation and democratic experimentalism are the best
that can be hoped for. If Tushnet is right about this, then The New
ConstitutionalOrder is a depressing narcotic. If he is wrong (and I am
right), then it is a call to arms.
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